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Preface 
 
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) aims to support 
governments, business and other organisations and to foster public confidence 
in risk governance and in related decision-making by  
- reflecting different views and practices and providing independent, 
authoritative information; 
- improving the understanding and assessment of important risks issues and 
any ambiguities involved; 
- designing innovative, efficient and balanced governance strategies. 
 
IRGC’s mission includes developing concepts of risk governance, anticipating 
major risk issues, and providing risk governance recommendations for key 
decision-makers. 
 
At the core of IRGC’s work is the concept and practice of risk governance, and 
central to this is the IRGC risk governance framework. The framework was 
developed precisely to provide a structure for combining the conventional 
practices of risk assessment, management and communication with the 
principles of good governance. The framework includes several innovations 
described fully in IRGC’s White Paper No1 “Risk Governance – Towards an 
Integrative Approach”, published in 2005. 
 
More recently, IRGC has endeavoured to identify commonly recurring “deficits” 
in risk governance. IRGC’s report on Risk Governance Deficits is designed to 
foster better understanding of their causes and how they can be prevented or 
mitigated through improved assessment and management. The IRGC project 
on risk governance deficits is an entry point to the current IRGC project on 
emerging risks. 
 
With this note, IRGC intends to help improve the understanding and 
governance of emerging global risks that have impacts on human health and 
safety, the environment, the economy and society at large. In general, IRGC is 
concerned that important opportunities for social and economic development 
may be foregone through inadequate risk governance of emerging issues. 
 
As with all IRGC concept notes, this document has the purpose of providing a 
brief summary of some of the issues that will be addressed in the course of 
future project. Comments are welcome on how this IRGC project can make a 
constructive contribution. 
 
More information on the project can be obtained from Marie Valentine Florin at 
marie.florin@irgc.org 
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Introduction 
 
This concept note is the first output of IRGC’s project on emerging risks. The 
project’s objective is not to develop a list of emerging risks but, instead, to 
focus on their origins. In this concept note IRGC proposes and describes a 
preliminary list of elements – sources, drivers and governance issues – related 
to how risks emerge. 
 
The sources, drivers and governance issues described in this paper draw on 
discussions at an IRGC roundtable held on 8 and 9 June 2009, hosted by the 
Swiss Re Centre for Global Dialogue. The roundtable brought together 30 
experts from different countries and sectors, including participants from 
academia, policymaking, industry, and the non-profit sector. Participants 
concluded that these elements have been important to the development of past 
risk issues in their emerging phase and remain relevant to many currently 
emerging risks.  
 
Once these elements and how they are structured are validated, revised or 
refined through more in-depth case studies and deliberation, IRGC plans to 
produce a policy brief that will explain in more detail than in this concept note 
the perspective it will develop on emerging risks. This perspective will also form 
the basis for IRGC’s development of practical guidelines for practitioners in 
business and the public sector, helping them improve their own capabilities to 
understand, anticipate, and respond to emerging risks. Work on these practical 
guidelines will be done in a second phase of this project and may take the form 
of developing an emerging risk framework. 
 
It should be stressed that the elements being introduced in this document refer 
specifically to emerging risks (or to risks re-emerging in a new form or context). 
Many of these elements are also relevant to the extent and pervasiveness of 
the many risks with which society deals on an everyday basis. IRGC1 uses the 
term “uncertain” to characterise risks and for which there is incomplete or 
inadequate knowledge. Thus, most emerging risks can be defined as uncertain. 
In the following pages we do not identify uncertainty as itself a specific driver of 
risk, but we shed some light on aspects of the uncertainty of new risks, and the 
associated challenges for risk governance. 
 
The audience of this concept note is both risk practitioners and members of the 
scientific community whose work is concerned with risk assessment and 
management of emerging issues. Later publications will be addressed to 
managers in government and industry responsible for the identification and 
early management of risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In its approach to risk governance, fully described in the IRGC White paper No1 “Risk governance 
– towards an Integrative Approach” [IRGC, 2005], IRGC advises that the knowledge about a risk 
can be characterised as being predominantly simple, complex, uncertain or ambiguous. 
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1. Framing the project 
Consider the current H1N1 flu epidemic, the recent financial meltdown, global 
climate change, the disruptions in Europe when Russia cut off gas supplies to 
Ukraine, the damages from hurricane Katrina, the tragic events of 9/11 and 
subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, the AIDS epidemic in 
Africa, and the rise of obesity in the developed world. Are each of these 
problems a distinct phenomenon, or are they all “emerging risks” that can be 
understood within a common intellectual perspective? In this concept note, 
IRGC explains how seemingly disparate risks can each be understood within a 
common perspective that covers sources, drivers, and governance. Before 
advancing, we define some of the key terms used in this document. 
 
1.1 Definitions 
Systemic risks 
IRGC focuses on risks that have a capacity to become global (or at least span 
several countries and sectors), thus requiring collective action. The systemic 
dimension of most important risks is a key focus of IRGC’s work. Dealing with 
interconnections between elements of social, technological, environmental and 
economic systems is a particular challenge for today’s risk governance. 
 
Emerging risks 
IRGC defines as “emerging” a risk that is new, or a familiar risk in new or 
unfamiliar conditions (e.g., the re-emergence of the polio virus). Emerging risks 
are issues that are perceived to be potentially significant but which may not be 
fully understood and assessed, thus not allowing risk management options to 
be developed with confidence. Some emerging risks do not prove to be as 
significant as originally feared but others may prove to be worse than expected, 
with a high potential for major losses. Typically, the future consequences of 
emerging risks cannot be defined in monetary terms, at least not to any 
satisfactory degree of precision. Thus, conventional approaches to projecting 
loss size, relative frequencies or probability distributions over time or severity of 
consequences are ineffective. Indeed, it is often difficult to establish causality 
between the source of the emerging risk and its consequences using 
conventional technical or scientific data. As scientific understanding of 
emerging risks may be changing – sometimes quite rapidly – the challenge for 
risk managers in government and industry can be serious, and it is easy to 
criticise managers after a risk has emerged, regardless of how competent their 
ex ante decisions may have been, given the information available.   
 
1.2 Sources, drivers and governance issues 
IRGC aims to shed light on emerging risks with a perspective that has three 
elements: sources of risk, drivers of risk, and governance issues.   
 
• Sources of risk are defined by the ISO as elements which alone or in 
combination have “the intrinsic potential to give rise to risk” [ISO, 
2009];  
• Drivers of risks act as amplifiers or attenuators of a risk by, for 
example, increasing its frequency or scale; 
• Governance issues related to emerging risks reflect how individuals 
and organisations deal with the emerging risks, and so also attenuate 
or amplify their potential consequences. The governance issues 
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proposed in this paper have been identified in the course of previous 
IRGC project work on governance deficits. 
 
1.3 Relationships between elements 
In this document IRGC assumes that there is an analytical difference between 
sources, drivers and governance issues: the source is the origin of the risk, and 
there cannot be a risk if there is no source of risk. But a source of risk may not 
generate risk unless it interacts with other elements. If these elements are 
emergent properties of driving trends in society, they are called drivers, as they 
are the trends that fundamentally drive the development of a risk. If they are 
related to how people and organisations deal with either the source itself or the 
trends that drive the development of the risk, they are called governance 
issues. By development we mean change, not necessarily increase or 
amplification, but also decrease or attenuation. 
 
It should also be noted that there is no hierarchy between these elements, 
meaning that no one is more important than another. Note also that the 
relationship between these elements is not linear or unidirectional, but can be 
in the form of a feedback loop (positive or negative); the sources, drivers and 
the governance issues may impact upon each other.  
 
 
Over the next year, IRGC will re-assess each of these elements in light of: 
 
• Whether they have been observed in the emerging phase of previous 
risks; and whether they are robust and relevant as possible 
components of guidelines for anticipating emerging risks; and 
• Their capacity to be anticipative and therefore their usefulness: Do 
they actually help people and organisations to anticipate the risks they 
may face in the future, and to improve the efficacy of “horizon 
scanning” and other early warning systems? 
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Summary Table 
 
 
Sources of risks 
 
 
1. Natural sources Deriving from the natural environment, even if 
conditioned by humans and human activity  
2. Human sources 
 
a. Unintended risks Harm may result from: 
• Self-hazardous behaviour 
• Co-generated risks 
• External risks 
b. Intended risks Intentional harm inflicted by one actor upon another 
3. Causal interactions between different sources 
 
The complexity of the phenomena involved means 
that it is not always possible to designate a risk’s 
cause as due to either natural or human sources. For 
many systemic risks, the cause is a combination of 
both. Examples of such risks include risks related to: 
• technical failure 
• international trade  
It is also difficult to differentiate between intentional 
and unintentional risks 
  
 
Drivers of risks 
 
Background characteristics, or trends, in the 
environment, science and society that act to either 
amplify or attenuate the scale, frequency or 
probability of  risks arising from various sources 
 
1. Knowledge of emerging risk 
Scientific knowledge about a risk and understanding 
of its perception are required for adequately 
assessing and managing a risk. In the case of 
emerging risks, this is most often incomplete. 
 
• When there is no knowledge about an emerging 
risk, it may be ignored or overlooked. 
• Uncertainty is a particular problem (tractable 
uncertainties vs. “deep unknowns”). 
• It is difficult to appreciate the gravity of a new 
possible risk. 
 
2. System complexity 
Some emerging risks are driven, positively or 
negatively, by the complexity of systems. 
 
 
• Systemic risks require collective, global action. 
• The increasing scale and connectivity of systems 
can be a driver of risk, acting either as a risk 
attenuator (increasing fitness) or amplifier (creating 
robust, yet increasingly fragile, systems). 
 
3. Social and cultural dynamics 
Change in society is not itself risky, but such change 
can play a role in amplifying or attenuating risks. 
 
 
Amongst the dimensions to which attention should 
be given are trends in: 
• Technological innovation; 
• Population dynamics; 
• Cultural, social and economic globalisation. 
 
4. Degree of development, poverty and inequality 
The exposed population’s degree of development, 
wealth and inequality may influence whether the risk 
is amplified or attenuated. 
 
 
• Variables such as wealth, literacy and education 
influence risk culture. 
• An organisation’s or population’s “risk culture” will 
determine its tolerance or aversion for a new risk, 
thus determining how this risk is prioritised. 
 
5. Natural resources and the environment 
The emergence of risk can be linked to a variety of 
stresses placed on the environment. 
 
• Overexploitation of natural resources is a recurring 
factor in the emergence of risks. 
• Ecosystems may fail to adapt to economic, social 
or environmental change. 
 
 
6. Competing interests, ideologies, values and 
 
• Values and cultures have an influence on risk 
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religions 
Cultural diversity builds resilience into society and so 
may attenuate the breadth or severity of harm, but 
conflicts over different futures may exacerbate it. 
taking. 
• But attitudes and opinions may also have 
geopolitical origin or be grounded in material 
interests. 
 
7. Variability in susceptibility to risk 
Risk does not affect all individuals and groups in an 
equal manner. 
 
• Geographic location, genetic make-up and prior 
experience all affect susceptibility to risk. 
 
 
 
 
Governance issues 
 
How organisations and individuals deal with emerging 
risks will determine how severe their consequences will 
be. 
 
1. Tackling complexity 
The approach used to manage complexity and to 
tackle risks emerging from complex systems can 
influence (amplify or attenuate) the scale of the 
consequences. 
 
 
• Governance of complex systems needs to account for 
the many linkages within and between systems. 
• Systems thinking vs. silo mentality. 
 
2. Dealing with tractable and deep uncertainty Assessing and managing uncertainty and ignorance 
when characteristics and potential consequences of 
risks are unknowns 
 
3. Governance of change and adapting institutions 
How apt an organisation is at dealing with change 
will determine how it is impacted by emerging risks. 
 
Of particular importance are: 
• The need for early-warning systems; 
• Adapting to change; 
• The science-society relationship; 
• Assessment of innovative technologies; 
• Regulation. 
 
4. Organisation and authority Organisational capacity and resource allocation 
 
5. Better agenda-setting  
With emerging risks, societies engage in a process 
of risk selection. Some risks are selected for priority 
attention while others are ignored or deferred. 
 
• The selection process is often influenced by specific 
interests expressed by powerful stakeholders. 
• Processes such as hyper-democracy can give too 
much influence to public views. 
 
 
6. Resolving conflicts 
Conflict resolution is a mechanism to attenuate risks 
that evolve into conflicts, but emerging risks led by 
competing interests, values or ideologies may be 
particularly difficult to handle. 
 
• It is often difficult to manage trade-offs when dealing 
with emerging risks. 
• Short-term orientation of reward systems may 
discourage prevention of long-term emerging risks. 
• When early signs of risk appear, preventive or 
mitigation measures are often opposed by concentrated 
economic interests. 
 
  
10 
 
2. Sources of risk 
At the most basic level, the sources of risks in life are natural phenomena, 
human activity, or a combination of the two. Outcomes from natural 
phenomena become risks only when they impact on the well-being of humans 
or on what is important to humanity (e.g., ecosystems). Risks that arise from 
human activity may be the unintended consequences of activities undertaken 
(or decisions made) for other purposes (e.g., the safety risks of driving a car for 
commuting or leisure purposes) or they may derive from intentional harm such 
as fraud or terrorism. In many countries, this difference is reflected in a legal 
distinction between civil liability (under the principle of the duty of care) and 
criminal law. 
 
We begin with a consideration of natural sources of risk and then explore why 
risks arise from human activity. We then describe how systemic risks often 
have sources that arise from human/natural interactions.  
 
2.1 Natural sources 
The most common sources of natural risks are bacteria, viruses, parasites, 
genetic variation, earthquakes (and the tsunamis they trigger), extreme 
weather conditions (including drought, extreme heat and cold), floods, storms 
and hurricanes, landslides, fires and volcanic eruptions.  
 
Bacteria are ubiquitous on Earth. A handful of soil contains millions of bacteria, 
which are essential to breaking down organic matter. Most are entirely 
harmless to man – indeed, many are essential to critical processes within the 
body, such as digestion. Some, however, are pathogenic, such as salmonella 
or MRSA (a “superbug” implicated in many hospital-associated infections). 
Pathogenic bacteria cause many widespread diseases such as tuberculosis, 
tetanus, pneumonia, typhoid fever, diphtheria and cholera. 
 
Viruses are agents of nature (we ignore here the possibility of an engineered 
virus released from the laboratory) that cause many diseases to humans. They 
vary in their transmissibility and virulence. The Ebola virus, for example, 
causes a type of viral haemorrhagic fever that is largely untreatable and can be 
particularly lethal, depending on the strain. Zoonosis refers to the process 
whereby a virus crosses the species barrier, infecting humans through transfer 
from infected animals. Ebola, SARS and HIV, for example, are believed to have 
zoonotic origins. 
 
Malaria is a deadly disease caused by a natural parasite carried and 
transmitted by mosquitoes. In tropical regions of the world where conditions are 
suitable for mosquitoes, the risk of malaria is heightened. Today there are 
approximately 250 million cases of acute malaria each year, from which some 
one million people die [WHO, 2009a]. One of the concerns about climate 
change – whether induced by nature or human activity – is that it may create 
new environments where malaria and other diseases can thrive. 
 
There are many risks linked to weather conditions: electrocution from lightning, 
flooding during hurricanes, deaths from extremely hot and cold weather, and 
damage from extreme winds and tornadoes. The European heatwave of 2003 
is estimated to have caused the deaths of 52,000 people [Larson, 2006]. An ice 
storm in the US in January 2009 killed 55 people and left 2 million without 
electricity [Biesk, 2009]. 
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Extreme weather conditions should not be confused with climate change, but 
the climate is changing and some of the potential effects of climate change are 
that patterns of extreme weather will change. There may be more frequent and 
more intense hurricanes and they may affect different parts of the world than 
they do now. Monsoons may become more intense. Globally, temperatures will 
slowly rise, as will sea level. Changes to the climate will also influence 
ecosystems; the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment has concluded that 15 out 
of 24 ecosystem services are already in decline or under threat [MEA, 2005]. 
 
The risks of earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions share geological 
origins. These events vary in predictability and severity but generate large 
amounts of premature death and property damage around the world. The 
December 2004 Asian tsunami is estimated to have killed 230,000 people in 11 
countries [Synolakis et al., 2005]. The 2008 Great Sichuan earthquake in China 
killed 69,000 people, injured 374,000 and left over 4 million homeless [USGS, 
2008].  
 
Solar radiation is the source of most of the world’s energy and gives us light 
and heat, but can also be a cause of cancer. Experts are currently concerned 
that a solar storm and other severe space weather events could cause serious 
and long-term damage to electricity grids and, as a consequence, to the 
functioning of all appliances and services dependent on electricity. It is also 
possible that a meteor travelling at extreme speed, possibly a very large one, 
could strike the earth and create massive immediate harm as well as climate 
change. 
  
Natural sources of risk are often familiar rather than emerging, in the sense that 
the term is used in this document.  However, viruses and bacteria have the 
capability to evolve and re-emerge (sometimes as a more deadly strain). They 
may mutate enough to bypass any immunity that has previously been 
developed or develop resistance to common pharmacologic treatments. Thus, 
viruses such as influenza re-emerge periodically. Even well-known natural 
sources of risk such as floods and earthquakes may be considered emerging 
due to population movements that multiply the number of people, businesses, 
and communities at risk – this increases the potential severity of the risk. 
Frequently, natural and man-made sources of risk interact to foster or 
exacerbate emerging risks, making them sources of systemic risks. 
 
2.2 Human sources 
Risks emerge from human activities and behaviours, but the resulting harm 
may be unintended or intended by the individuals who generate the risk. In the 
analysis that follows, we also distinguish the person(s) or group(s) who 
generate the risk from those who bear the risk, since they may not be the same 
individual(s) or group(s). 
 
(a) Unintended risks 
Self-hazardous behaviour refers to situations where the same person who 
generates a risk also bears the risk.  We shall assume the adverse outcome of 
the risk is not intended to occur. (If the adverse outcome is intended, such as 
suicide, it is a form of intentional risk generation, which is addressed below). 
Self-hazardous behaviour is a major concern among public health and medical 
professionals, governments, as well as private sector players (such as 
insurance companies) around the world. 
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Rational forms of self-hazardous behaviour occur when a presumably informed 
individual incurs risk in exchange for other perceived benefits. For example, 
drivers accelerate their vehicle in order to reduce travel time to a destination 
even though they know that the probability and severity of crashes rise with 
travel speed, at least under many circumstances. Consumers treat themselves 
to calorie-rich desserts even though they know that obesity is an increasing 
problem in many societies. The thrill of extreme skiing or sky diving is pursued 
despite the danger. Anyone volunteering for military service does so in full 
knowledge of the risk of capture, injury, torture and/or death. 
 
Not all forms of self-hazardous behaviour are rational. Mental illness can lead 
to alcoholism or other risky personal behaviours. Addictions – physical or 
psychological – are known to contribute to smoking, alcohol abuse, excessive 
gambling and food disorders, some of the leading behavioural causes of harm 
from self-hazardous behaviour. 
 
Co-generated risks arise when two or more agents, usually related by 
informal or formal contracts, engage in decision-making that generates risk that 
is incurred by at least one of them. 
 
Employers and employees co-generate risk. An employer may offer a job with 
tasks known to be hazardous but compensate the worker with formal hazard 
pay. When workers are represented by unions, bargaining covers not just 
wages but also the extent of workplace hazards and safety measures, including 
who should bear the healthcare costs and foregone earnings associated with 
injuries and deaths incurred on the job.  
 
When bargaining in the labour market is considered an inadequate response to 
workplace hazards, regulations may also be issued.  Workplace health and 
safety is heavily regulated in many countries, precisely to reduce or transfer 
many of the risks of carrying out one’s job. Globally, the International Labour 
Organization reports over 270 million occupational accidents annually and that 
they result in about two million deaths among workers [ILO, 2005]. The global 
rate of occupational accidents has been increasing in recent decades, although 
not as rapidly as the rate of growth in economic activity.   
 
Consumers and producers (including suppliers of producers) make decisions 
that co-generate risks that may be incurred when the product is produced, 
transported, stored or consumed. In ideal markets, risks throughout the supply 
chain are well known, the parties are equally well-informed, and no parties 
have undue market power (e.g., in the form of monopoly or monopsony). The 
contract between producer and consumer typically states that a product, when 
used or consumed properly, will do what it should do and will not cause undue 
harm to the consumer; where the producer is aware of potential harm, this is 
communicated to the consumer (normally in the form of product labelling as in 
warnings about allergens or carcinogens).  
 
In the case of many co-generated risks, one or more parties has the option of 
declining to accept the risk, by not accepting a job, not purchasing a product, 
choosing a different supplier, or choosing to travel by a different means. 
Globally, 1.2 million road users die annually in road accidents; the WHO 
estimates that figure will rise to 2.4 million by the year 2030 [WHO, 2009b]. 
Concern about co-generated risks rises when choices are highly constrained 
(i.e., there are no substitute jobs, products or means of transport available, or 
when substitution is difficult or costly). 
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Even seemingly well-functioning supply chains give rise to risks of concern to 
the public. During the recent financial meltdown, for example, bundles of risky 
mortgages were resold to investors around the world through instruments 
called derivatives, yet the real risks of the bundles were not disclosed. In fact, 
the derivatives (and the companies who marketed them) were often assigned 
the highest ratings with regard to investment risk.  
 
Co-generated risks from international trade are coming under increasing 
scrutiny by the World Trade Organization. Due to highly publicised risks from 
consumption of products produced in China and sold in the United States and 
Europe, China is under increasing pressure to strengthen its health, safety and 
environmental regulations. Yet the World Trade Organization has also found 
that some regulations of imported products are a de facto form of protectionism 
(designed to protect local markets from global competitors) rather than a well-
designed effort to protect human health, safety and the environment. 
 
Thus, co-generated risks are not always simple issues involving a single 
worker and his or her employer. In our globalised economy, co-generated risks 
give rise to complex regulatory, trade and foreign policy issues. 
 
External risks – called “externalities” if they have not been priced in a market 
system – arise when the party who bears the risk is different from the party who 
generates the risk.  As a result, the risk generator has no formal relationship 
with the risk bearer (even though they may be residents and taxpayers in the 
same community). External risks can be either common pool risks (such as 
climate change) or third party risks where an identifiable number of people are 
affected and could organise themselves (such as in a community suffering from 
polluted drinking water). 
 
An external risk may arise from production or consumption of a product. For 
example, the process of manufacturing a car may create pollution at plants 
throughout the supply chain, pollution that creates risks for third parties who 
were not involved in the market for cars. When the car is used, pollution may 
occur at the tailpipe of the vehicle, the precise amount of pollution depending 
on how much the car is used and how well the engine is maintained. 
 
Industrial facilities are well-known sources of external risks. For example, 
pollution-induced diseases have occurred due to chemical exposures from a 
factory that has polluted well-water in a nearby community. The catastrophic 
chemical release in Bhopal, India, in 1984 killed several thousand people within 
72 hours [Sharma, 2005].  
 
Transboundary external risks occur when risk generators and risk bearers are 
in different countries.  In other words, parties in one country may incur an 
unintentional risk that is generated by activities in another country. For 
example, the radiation fallout from the Chernobyl nuclear accident extended 
over much of Europe and even reached eastern North America. Energy-
security risks have a more complex dynamic. As more and more crude oil 
passes through the Malacca Straits, much of it bound from the Middle East to 
China, the people and natural environments of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonesia are exposed to the potential risks of an oil spill such as those caused 
by the Torrey Canyon (affecting coasts and wildlife in the UK and France) and 
Exxon Valdez (Alaska, US). 
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Another illustration of transboundary risks is related to resource depletion. The 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources such as water supplies, forests 
or fisheries create externalities. Even if all parties generating the risk prefer that 
the risk not be generated (i.e., to assure long-term access to the resource), a 
“tragedy of the commons” may occur when no agent will act to prevent the risk 
unless all agents act in unison. This has been the case with the depletion of 
many fisheries in the world’s seas and oceans. As demands for finite supplies 
of natural resources continue to increase without any effective collective 
mechanism to address the commons problem, transboundary external risks 
tend to be shifted to the future, with serious consequences for future 
generations. 
 
(b) Intended risks (intentional harm inflicted by one actor upon 
another) 
People can be exposed to risks that are deliberately generated by others 
(individuals, groups, nations or groups of nations) in order to meet certain 
objectives or satisfy psychological impulses. Examples of intentional harm 
include theft, cyber attacks, murder, terrorism and acts of war. In contrast to the 
harm of pollution, which is typically an unintended side-effect of production or 
consumption activity, the harm from an intentional risk is typically the outcome 
that is desired by the agent generating the risk. 
 
Inside the family, examples of intentional risks include child and spouse abuse. 
Within a community, examples include rape, assault, burglary, robbery and 
murder. The risk generators may be individuals or they may be groups, such as 
the violent gangs that operate in some cities around the world. Within a nation 
state, intentional risks also encompass the violence generated by isolated 
terrorist incidents, organised terrorist campaigns and even civil war. And nation 
states, through organised military action (e.g., covert or declared war) have 
imposed intentional risks on other states for a wide range of reasons (e.g., 
access to valued natural resources, attempted resolution of border disputes, 
and religious or ideological conflict).   
 
In business, individual corporations face intentional risks such as employee 
theft and sabotage. Within the business world at large, intentional risks include 
cases of corporate fraud such as the bogus accounting schemes that led to the 
Enron scandal in the US and the recent Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. 
 
 
2.3 Causal interactions between different sources 
Many systemic risks arise because of complex causal interactions between 
different natural and/or human sources. More often than not, human and 
natural systems cannot be usefully disentangled, and technological systems 
reside at the complex interface between these systems. All three types of 
system co-evolve; in other words, they each form a key part of the environment 
influencing the other two. Take the potential risks that could arise from 
synthetic biology as an example: the source of these risks would be related to 
how natural biological components interact with ‘engineered’ components in a 
technological system that is neither entirely natural, nor entirely human-made. 
Both biological evolution (natural) and technological advancement (human) will 
affect how the system develops and the sort of potential risks that could 
emerge.  
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Other examples of such risks include risks related to technical failures or to 
international trade:  
 
Technology is “man-made” and thus sources of technological risks are most 
often “human”. However, technical failures are most often not caused by 
human action alone, and are illustrative of this third category of risk sources, 
where a technological system straddles the human-natural divide. For example,  
a natural event, such as a storm, could damage electricity infrastructure, 
causing various risks to emerge. Human behaviour (such as error in design or 
management of the technical system) interacts with natural forces to bring 
about the risk.  
 
Similarly, the origin of risks related to international trade can be a combination 
of natural factors (e.g., parasites or biological food contaminants present in one 
region of the world, but not in others) and human factors (modern transport 
systems, geopolitics and international trade regulations which can determine 
whether and how widely this contaminated food is spread to other countries) 
 
For systemic risks of this kind it may also be difficult to distinguish between 
intended and unintended risks. The example of the melamine-contaminated 
infant formula discovered in China in 2008 provides a good example: in this 
case, it is clear that the addition of melamine to milk was intentional (it was 
designed to make the milk appear to have higher protein content, allowing it to 
meet nutritional standards), but it is also clear that manufacturers were 
unaware of melamine’s toxic effect on infants. Making infants seriously ill 
(causing kidney stones and renal failure) was not at all a sought outcome, and 
in this sense it was unintentional. However, it is also possible to argue that 
manufacturers knew that the infant formula would be harmful to health, simply 
due to its lack of adequate nutrition, and thus they were intentionally creating a 
health risk.  
 
 
 
 
In conclusion, whether a source of risk is natural, human, intentional or 
unintentional is thus not always clear-cut and can involve some degree of 
subjectivity. Nevertheless the above categories of sources can be useful in 
guiding thinking about the processes by which risks emerge. 
 
 
3. Drivers of risk 
What we call “drivers” are background characteristics (or trends) in the 
environment, science and society that act to either amplify or attenuate the 
scale or frequency of risks arising from various sources. These drivers are 
typically independent of how individuals and institutions cope with particular 
risks, and thus the drivers of risk are not typically the target of risk-specific 
governance measures, which we address in section 4.  
 
Conceptually, an amplifying driver increases the likelihood/frequency of risk 
and/or exacerbates the adverse outcomes of a risk (above baseline levels).  An 
attenuating driver operates in the opposite direction: lowering the frequency of 
risk and/or diminishing the severity of harm from an emerging risk. Strictly 
speaking, only the sources of risk described in section 2 “cause” risks to occur 
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but the drivers we address in this section can play a powerful role in magnifying 
or diminishing a risk that emerges from natural and/or man-made sources.   
 
While we have advanced a conceptual distinction between sources and drivers, 
we recognise that the distinction is not routinely made. Lumping sources and 
drivers together may be adequate for risk managers in some cases, since the 
distinction may not be relevant to risk assessment or the design of particular 
management measures. But when we consider broad social efforts that 
address multiple emerging risks (e.g., poverty reduction, expanded scientific 
research, improved educational systems, and better health care), it may be 
useful to understand the drivers separately from the natural and man-made 
sources of particular risks. 
 
The proposed drivers are neither exclusive nor exhaustive. Major risk issues 
are systemic and several drivers may be relevant to them. Additionally, each 
driver will impact differently and over different time periods and some drivers 
will have an immediate impact, others will not. 
 
3.1 Knowledge of emerging risks 
When adequate knowledge about an emerging risk exists, a formal risk 
assessment can be undertaken, the risk can be evaluated as acceptable, 
tolerable or unacceptable and, when appropriate, risk management options can 
be developed and implemented to avoid, reduce or mitigate the risk. But, when 
critical knowledge about it is missing or unavailable to decision-makers, the risk 
may be ignored or overlooked, which can allow the risk to become more likely, 
more widespread, and/or more harmful.  
 
At the early stages of the AIDS epidemic, for example, scientific understanding 
of the HIV virus was insufficient to assess risk and design meaningful risk 
management actions. During the period that the virus was studied, the virus 
spread further and the epidemic accelerated. Knowledge acted as an 
attenuator with respect to the risks from CFCs and other ozone-depleting 
substances. The Montreal Protocol, which led to the prohibition of the 
manufacture and use of CFCs (1989), was signed only 16 years after scientists 
discovered the link between CFCs, their release of chlorine into the 
stratosphere, and the destruction of ozone [UNEP, 1987; Benedick, 2007]. 
 
Who has possession of the knowledge can also be a significant factor in risk 
amplification. Asymmetry of information, where some stakeholders have more 
knowledge about an emerging risk than others, can lead to incorrect risk 
assessments and imprudent risk management decisions. In the financial sector 
there are often asymmetries between the suppliers of financial products and 
the consumers who buy and use them. Such asymmetries played a large part 
in bringing about the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US in 2007-08, as 
purchasers of mortgage-backed securities, for example, did not realise how 
risky an investment they were making, as they did not have full knowledge of 
how the financial product had been created and rated. 
 
Perceived knowledge – what a stakeholder thinks he or she knows, as 
opposed to what he or she actually knows – can have a similar effect on risk 
amplification. For instance, in the example above, an investor buying a 
mortgage-backed security might feel secure and be over-confident because he 
believes he has good knowledge about the financial market and confidence in 
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the high rating of the product, but in reality he does not really have adequate 
knowledge to do a proper risk assessment.  
  
In the context of emerging risks, uncertainty is a cause of confusion, 
controversy and delay of precautionary measures.  Indeed, uncertainty creates 
space for obfuscation by stakeholders, who may seek retention of the status 
quo even when it seems likely that serious risks are emerging. 
 
3.2 System complexity 
Some emerging risks are driven – positively or negatively – by the complexity 
of organisational and/or technological systems. There are numerous definitions 
of “complexity”, but IRGC defines complexity as the “difficulty of identifying and 
quantifying causal links between a multitude of potential causal agents and 
specific observed effects [IRGC, 2005]. Here we refer generally to the tendency 
to expand the interdependency of various components of systems, including 
the interdependency between entire systems. Interdependency can increase 
resilience or vulnerability to systemic risks, and it is not obvious when 
complexity is acting as an amplifier or attenuator.  
 
The scale and connectivity of the complex systems on which society depends 
are both increasing. Formerly discrete complex technical systems, such as 
electricity distribution systems, are now interconnected and operating in ways 
not intended at the time of their original design and construction. Adding 
functionalities to existing systems that were not conceived for those additional 
purposes increases their fragility and the risk of cascading failures. The supply 
chains supporting most of the world’s food, energy, and information and 
communication sectors are increasingly interlinked. Many cities are themselves 
becoming increasingly large and densely populated, requiring ever-increasing 
supplies of energy, food and other essentials from elsewhere.  
 
Scale and connectivity can be risk drivers. The rapid spread of SARS to many 
countries, and its impact on trade, tourism and the economy (as well as its 
direct impact on public health), is an illustration of an emerging, systemic risk. 
Others include the cascading failures of interconnected electricity grids and 
how climate change will affect, differently, various segments of the world’s 
populations and ecosystems. 
 
For many networked systems, within limits, the average fitness of the system 
increases as the level of connectivity increases. One can see this in the use of 
portfolios to spread asset and investment risks, in how the modern electricity 
grid both allows power to be transmitted over large areas and reduces the risk 
of localised blackouts, and in how trade linkages (as between the US and 
China) may reduce the incentive for international conflict. 
 
However there is also evidence that, as connectivity increases, so does the 
probability of major failures. The networks literature uses the term “robust yet 
fragile”: “a system may appear stable for long periods of time and withstand 
many external shocks (robust), then suddenly and apparently inexplicably 
exhibit a large cascade” [Watts, 2002]. “Increasing the number of connections 
causes an increase in the average fitness of agents, yet at the same time 
makes the system as a whole more vulnerable to catastrophic failures on a 
near-global scale” [Ormerod and Colbaugh, 2006]. The literature relating to 
socio-ecological systems also refers to a system becoming increasingly 
inflexible prior to a “chaotic collapse and release phase” [Walker et al, 2004]. 
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Many are concerned that the same interconnectivity that makes the electricity 
grid more resilient also increases its fragility and the risk of cascading failure. 
 
The economy, demographics, the environment, energy and food supply, and 
climate constitute five “tectonic stresses" in key global systems. These 
stresses, combined with multipliers such as interconnectivity between people 
and between systems, greatly increase the risk of a cascading collapse of 
systems vital to our well-being — a phenomenon sometimes called 
"synchronous failure” [Homer-Dixon, 2006].  
 
As seen in section 2.3, some risk sources are a complex combination of human 
and natural sources. These more complex sources of risk arise owing to the 
existence of complex and interpenetrating human, technological and natural 
systems that co-evolve along contingent and path-dependent trajectories to 
produce sets of factors that cause outcomes some people regard as dangerous 
(i.e., risks). Since human and technological systems are adaptive, they tend to 
become more complex and connected over time. Rising complexity is therefore 
a deep characteristic of our global system’s change through time (with the 
caveat that many natural systems are being simultaneously simplified by 
human degradation).  
 
3.3 Social and cultural dynamics 
Change in society is not necessarily risky but social and cultural dynamics can 
play a significant role in amplifying or attenuating risks and, therefore, need to 
be monitored closely. 
 
Changing lifestyles and behaviours are examples of how social and cultural 
dynamics may drive emerging risks. This can be illustrated by obesity, an 
increasing problem in the US and elsewhere. Although obesity is not new, it 
was only rare during most of human history. Its increasing prevalence now can 
be seen as the result of economic and social dynamics. In the US, the price of 
food has fallen steadily in real terms while the fraction of meals consumed 
outside the home (often at fast-food restaurants) has risen. The food industry is 
under competitive pressure to offer enticing products to customers, products 
that tend to be high in caloric and fat content. At the same time, the growing 
role of television and computers in American life is causing more people to live 
sedentary lifestyles. The combination of more calories and less exercise 
exacerbates the risk of obesity. The long-term costs of obesity are spread 
throughout society (individuals, families, employers, food companies, health 
care providers, health insurers and taxpayers), and thus there is an external 
aspect of a phenomenon that appears to be “self-hazardous” behaviour. On the 
other hand, other social changes, notably changes in education levels, have 
the capacity to attenuate risks like those linked to obesity. More people having 
greater understanding and access to information about what constitutes a 
healthy diet and lifestyle could contribute to reducing rates of obesity. 
 
Whenever any single process in society changes at a rate that exceeds the 
adaptation capability of a related process, there is a risk of dysfunction. Thus, if 
technological, biological or social change occurs rapidly at the same time that 
industrial associations, NGOs, international organisations, nation states or 
political institutions are faltering, emerging risks can be amplified. In this 
context, it is not surprising that the epidemic of AIDS in Africa has proven to be 
far more devastating than in developed countries around the world where 
functional governments – including public health, educational and medical 
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organisations – have worked together with some degree of effectiveness in 
slowing the epidemic. 
 
There are three specific dynamics which appear to be of particular importance 
to the amplification and attenuation of risks: the process of technological 
innovation, changing population dynamics and globalisation. 
 
Technological innovation and diffusion 
Technological innovation offers many benefits as well as risks. Products 
created using synthetic biology are potential examples of technological 
innovations with the capacity to attenuate risks (for example via the creation of 
new drug and vaccine development pathways), but in some circumstances, 
synthetic biology techniques might amplify risks (for example by enabling the 
construction of new ‘weapons’ that could be used by bioterrorists). 
 
Risk may be driven by the rapid diffusion of new technologies throughout 
society – especially diffusion that occurs without careful monitoring of impacts 
on human health and the environment, and adequate regulation. Such diffusion 
can be a potent influence on the scale and impact of emerging risks. Devices 
such as mobile phones, for example, are rapidly entering the daily lives of 
hundreds of millions of people around the world. The economic and social 
benefits of these devices have been enormous. Belatedly, though, questions 
are being raised about whether drivers of motor vehicles should use these 
devices (hand-held versus hands-free versus no use) and whether distracted 
pedestrians and cyclists are inadvertently placing themselves at risk.  
 
The speed of innovation and diffusion is such that regulatory processes 
designed to assure safety often cannot keep up (see 4.2, Regulation). This 
applies equally to novel technologies with multiple fields of application (such as 
nanotechnology, which challenges regulators of foods, pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, medical devices and electronic goods) as well as a single 
technological innovation for which there is no regulatory framework (e.g., the 
geological storage of CO2 captured from coal-fired power plants). 
 
Technology diffusion also acts as a powerful attenuator of risk. Some countries 
now deliver emergency awareness messages to their populations using text 
messages sent over mobile networks. Airbags in cars, new medicines and 
surgical techniques, and automated trips in electrical networks are all 
innovations that dampen risks to people and society. 
 
Population dynamics 
Population changes, whether slow or rapid, can influence the pace and severity 
of emerging risks. For example, many societies are forecasting fiscal and social 
imbalances from the growing ratio of senior citizens to younger workers. The 
ageing of populations has been slow and predictable, yet faster than the ability 
of political and economic institutions to respond. Likewise, the urbanisation of 
many developing countries may exacerbate the spread of some risks (e.g., 
viruses) while creating vulnerability to large-scale losses from faulty or 
outmoded infrastructure. 
 
Some population changes occur quite rapidly, and they may generate risks that 
are worrisome to affected populations. In some countries the rate of both legal 
and illegal immigration has outpaced the ability of social institutions to cope 
with individuals and families who confront language and cultural barriers in 
daily life. Immigrants offer many economic and social benefits to host countries 
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but they also create costs and risks for schools, social services, and law 
enforcement institutions. Resistance to rapid immigration is a persistent source 
of social and political conflict and, in extreme situations, can precipitate 
discrimination, terrorism, border conflicts and military conflict.    
 
Cultural, social and economic globalisation 
The rapid growth of international trade has had many beneficial consequences 
but it has also been a source of risk and conflict. Proponents of globalisation 
argue that it has been a force for wider prosperity, modernisation, and 
democracy around the world. Opponents counter that many impoverished 
communities have been unaffected – or have even been hurt – by 
globalisation.  It has also been linked to rising social and economic inequality.  
As mentioned earlier, globalisation also creates distance between agents who 
generate risks and agents who incur risks, as when citizens of one country are 
harmed by products imported from another where regulatory standards are less 
rigorous.  
 
3.4 Degree of development, poverty and inequality 
A community that lacks income, wealth, literacy, formal education and social 
capital may be highly vulnerable to an emerging risk. Likewise, a community 
strong in these assets may be better able to muster the human and/or financial 
resources necessary to implement preventive and mitigating responses. 
 
Both within and between countries, the degree of social and economic 
inequality is also influential. Communities with huge inequalities in access to 
medicine, public health, education, the Internet and social activities may be 
more vulnerable than communities with a more equal distribution of these 
assets. Thus, when a community’s vulnerability to emerging risk is assessed, it 
is important to assess the degree of inequality in the community as well as the 
absolute, average levels of social capital.  
 
Individuals and communities also differ in their preferences, or what has 
variously been called risk appetite, risk culture or degree of risk aversion. The 
world’s poorest face a daily challenge to obtain food, water and shelter; to 
them, some of what are considered risks by wealthier populations are an 
irrelevance. Rich and poor may therefore identify and prioritise risks differently, 
meaning that an emerging risk with potential global consequences may spread 
more or less rapidly depending on how important it is to the people who first 
experience it.  
 
Attitudes toward risk are not determined solely by economic variables such as 
per capita income. Societies with similar degrees of development often exhibit 
quite different tolerances for specific risks. For example, the European Union 
has tolerated more risk from tobacco, lead and tailpipe pollution than the US 
while the US has tolerated more risk than Europe from firearms, motor vehicle 
crashes and innovative methods of food production. Social scientists have 
found that societies engage in an implicit process of risk selection, and the 
risks a society worries about help define its “risk culture”. Without 
understanding these risk cultures, the path taken by emerging risks may seem 
perplexing to observers who consider only the technical issues.   
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3.5 Natural resources and the environment 
The emergence of some risks can be linked to a variety of stresses placed on 
the environment as a result of human interaction and interference. Over-
exploitation of natural resources and the pace of environmental change are 
noted here because, while they are not the only stresses, they are recurring 
factors in the emergence and amplification of many risks (e.g., ozone depletion, 
species extinction, food and water shortages and international conflicts). 
 
Access to natural resources 
Economic development over the last 100 years was facilitated by the extraction 
and use of many of the world’s natural resources. The rate of use continues to 
increase, primarily due to the growing world population and the increasing 
spending power and resulting demand for goods from emerging economies 
such as China and India. 
 
Much of the attention is devoted to energy resources such as oil and natural 
gas, but many of the world’s other natural resources, such as those provided 
by ecosystems, are also being consumed. They include fresh water, capture 
fisheries, or wood fuel, and there are warnings of future supply shortages of 
phosphates (used as an agricultural fertiliser), aluminium, copper and others.  
As the pressure on these resources continues to mount, sustainability experts 
are concerned that global population and resource consumption will outstrip the 
ability of mankind to survive without imposing unacceptable risks on 
ecosystems and the welfare of future generations. 
 
Some countries are resource-rich, others are not. Almost no country has 
access to all the natural resources it needs, whether oil, agricultural land, fresh 
water, food, or metals. Without effective trading systems and foreign 
assistance, regional shortages and imbalances of natural resources – or even 
the perception of future shortages – may be drivers of risk, having the capacity 
to either attenuate or amplify conflicts between and even within nations.  
 
Environmental change 
Some features of ecosystems (many of which provide services vital to people) 
may be particularly slow to adapt to economic, social, or environmental change 
and are therefore vulnerable to rapid escalation of stresses caused by external 
factors.  
 
Biodiversity is threatened when change is too rapid. Thus, it is not necessarily 
the absolute rate of change in a process that triggers risk but the relative rate of 
change in one process compared to another. In the case of global climate 
change, the pace of change needs to be considered as well as the amount of 
change because adaptation is more feasible and effective if the pace of change 
is lessened. In this respect, climate change is itself an environmental stressor 
that operates as a specific driver of risks. 
 
Environmental change may in turn amplify or attenuate emerging risks in 
sectors of society, and a particular aspect of this is the use of natural 
resources. 
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Competing interests, ideologies, values and religions 
Cultural diversity builds a degree of resilience into society and, therefore 
attenuates the breadth or severity of harm from some risks. But a more 
perverse effect of diversity is that it may amplify risks as conflicts over different 
visions of the future slow a society’s reaction time or spawn ancillary risks 
related to the original conflict.   
 
Religion, ideology and, more generally, values and culture, have a significant 
influence on risk-taking. Indeed, risks may be driven by religious, ideological or 
cultural beliefs that motivate dangerous or conflictual behaviours and/or 
discourage protective or preventive actions. For example, intolerant religious 
beliefs may foster war, terrorism and human rights violations (if adequate 
governance systems are not in place). Also, some public attitudes towards 
technologies, and the risks they pose, may be linked to beliefs, religion and/or 
ideology. For example, opposition of some religions to blood transfusions 
prevents the improvement of health status. Also, organised resistance to 
technological development, such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology or 
nuclear power, may be rooted, at least in part, in cultural resistance to 
developments that seem “unnatural”, although those technologies could, if 
pursued competently, contribute to the resolution of some of the risks related to 
food and energy supply. 
 
Not all attitudes and opinions are based on religion or ideology. Some that 
have been linked to warfare have geopolitical origins (e.g., border regions 
around the world that have been sources of conflict for generations). Other 
attitudes that exacerbate or diminish risk are grounded in material interests and 
behaviour such as consumerism and access to resources and wealth.  
  
3.6 Variability in susceptibility to risk 
Risk does not affect all individuals or populations in an equal manner. 
Contextual factors such as geographical location, genetic makeup (biological 
fitness) or prior experience all affect susceptibility to risk. 
 
Many weather-induced risks – drought, hurricanes, ice storms – affect only 
limited parts of the world and a minority of the world’s population. The impacts 
of climate change will be felt all over the world, but the precise impacts will 
vary: coastal areas affected by rising sea levels will not be affected equally, 
depending on local factors such as coastal slope, the built infrastructure, the 
occurrence of storms and surges and the ability of coastal ecosystems to adapt 
to sea level changes and storm damage. Most people view the melting of the 
Arctic ice sheet as an event with only adverse consequences, but it has already 
opened up a summer shipping route north of Russia that can shorten some 
voyages. 
 
Evolution is an ongoing process and is, for example, the natural phenomenon 
behind the emergence of new viruses and bacteria and the ability of bacteria to 
mutate and develop resistance to antibiotics. Natural selection, a key 
mechanism of evolution, explains why some human populations are less 
susceptible to some diseases than others (e.g., some populations are more 
resistant to malaria than others). But the genetic variation that is a driving force 
of evolution can also create gene variants that predispose individuals to 
disease. For example, specific gene variants are known to contribute to the 
causation of obesity, some cancers, and other diseases.   
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Within a lifetime, people also adapt their behaviour in response to risk. 
Learning from past experience is a key factor, as the experienced skier or 
sailor is less at risk than a beginner, particularly in difficult conditions. In Japan, 
for example, the knowledge of what to do in case of an earthquake is widely 
spread in the population. In economic policy, governments have learned over 
time that free-floating exchange rates are less dangerous to their economies 
than fixed rates.   
 
Thus, in order to project the future of an emerging risk, analysts need to 
account for the variability in the susceptibility of the exposed population as well 
as the population’s likely adaptations. 
 
 
4. Governance issues 
How individuals and organisations deal with emerging risks, and the underlying 
uncertainty about them, will determine how severe their consequences will be. 
We acknowledge that the early handling of an emerging risk may require that 
decision-makers take decisions and act in situations of uncertainty – without as 
much knowledge as they may feel they need.  Here we consider, in broad 
terms, what organisations responsible for risk governance do when they try to 
prevent or reduce the adverse consequences of emerging risks, and that these 
governance issues interact with how the risks emerge. 
 
4.1 Tackling complexity 
How business and policymakers deal with risks that arise from complexity will 
determine the gravity of potential consequences. The characteristics of many 
interdependent systems – notably deep uncertainty (see 4.2), disproportional 
causation/non-linearity and time lags – render their governance particularly 
challenging. The failure to deploy “systems thinking” can be a critical 
shortcoming in risk management activities. By “systems thinking” we refer to 
rigorous examination of the linkages between social, physical and natural 
systems in order to avoid fragmented, sub-optimal and hence unsustainable 
solutions (e.g., fragmentation of technical systems, as with electricity grids, or 
of regulatory approaches, as with patents). Some systems can be loosely 
coupled and can be adequately handled by dealing with sub-elements 
separately, but some technical systems (such as the network for European 
electricity distribution) have become so tightly coupled and complex that it is 
difficult even for experts to understand them and their associated cause-effect 
relationships. There may also be unawareness, or even deliberate ignorance, 
of the risks involved. 
 
Governance problems may arise because policymakers view risks one at a 
time with a “silo mentality.” For example, critics of recent mandates of ethanol 
as a petroleum substitute argue that the mandates exhibited this failure in 
thinking. A preoccupation with a desire to reduce oil consumption was acted 
upon without carefully considering the complex ramifications for land use, 
climate change, water supplies and food prices. A failure to think at a systems 
level has also been an obstacle to the design of intelligent health care policies.  
Efforts to expand access to health care often fail to consider cost ramifications 
while efforts to control costs often fail to consider impacts on the quality of 
patient care. 
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Thus, when a risk is addressed in its emerging phase, it is crucial for risk 
managers in the private and public sectors to see how the emerging risk is 
connected to complex systems, and how various solutions that are proposed 
will impact, directly and indirectly, on the entire society, including the 
environment. Governance of complexity is often associated with the use of 
scenario analysis, which is one useful tool for exploring the many possible 
future ‘pathways’ along which a complex system may develop. Without 
assigning each scenario anything approximating a precise probability, risk 
managers can seek to identify sets of elements (sources, drivers, governance 
issues) that might jointly cause risks to emerge. 
 
When there are concerns about emerging risks from complex systems, 
managers often consider ways to build in redundancies and resilience that 
reduce the probability and/or consequences of adverse events.  This strategy, 
sometimes called “defence in depth”, originated in military strategy and has 
been widely used to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants and space 
exploration vessels. 
 
4.2 Dealing with tractable and deep uncertainty 
 
Uncertainty is by no means specific to emerging risks, but dealing with it when 
risks emerge is a specific challenge. First one has to characterise the kind of 
uncertainty that affects the scientific knowledge about the risk and the 
complexity of the system in which it operates (see 3.2). Different kinds of 
uncertainty will imply exploring systems boundaries, variability in risk 
management and uncertainty in implementation. 
 
Scientific uncertainties come in many forms. Tractable uncertainties are those 
that could be resolved by qualified scientists but are not resolved due to 
insufficient funding, inadequate facilities, misdirected scientific effort, or 
adherence to outmoded hypotheses or theories. More troubling are the deep 
unknowns – situations of deep and structural uncertainty where scientific 
resolution is unlikely for the foreseeable future. The distinction between 
tractable and deep uncertainty is not always obvious when decision-makers are 
faced with the unknown but it is crucial to recognise that some scientific 
uncertainties will not be resolved in the time-frame necessary for effective risk 
management. 
 
People trying to manage complex interdependent systems usually cannot 
estimate with any precision future system behaviour or its associated risks. 
Particularly during the emerging phase of risks, risk assessors and managers 
are often surrounded by ‘known unknowns’ and ‘unknown unknowns’, which 
means, in the latter case, that they are ignorant of their own ignorance. 
 
4.3 Governance of change and adapting institutions 
As seen in 3.3 (social and cultural dynamics) change is a normal process that 
can play a role as an amplifier or attenuator of risk. Therefore, how apt an 
organisation is at dealing with change, how well it can adapt its own structures 
and processes in order to effectively mitigate the emerging risk, will determine 
how it is impacted by this risk. A number of specific aspects of governance 
structures and processes are important to emerging risks: 
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Early warning systems 
In the absence of the capabilities to detect early signals of risk, there is a large 
chance that the risks will materialise with maximum impact, given that no-one 
saw them coming in time to undertake prevention or mitigation efforts.  
 
Of particular importance are: 
• detecting “hidden” concentrations or accumulations of exposures 
whose size, scale and impact could have a material adverse effect; 
• complex and “opaque” products or services which are understood by 
only a few experts; 
• looking for discontinuities or tipping points which indicate either unclear 
”rules of the game” or a likely change; 
• lengthy dependent “chains” of any type, since they are only as strong 
as the “weakest link”; 
• more scenario analysis and “stress testing” outside the range of 
“business as usual”; 
• imagining unintended consequences of public policy and regulation, 
and looking for connections which could arise between “seemingly 
unrelated” trends; and 
• measuring trends in diverging views between groups on critical issues 
such as genetic testing, genetic engineering or climate change, as 
such diverging views can be precursors to emerging risks or can 
complicate efforts at taking precautionary or mitigation measures. 
 
Many risks have been allowed to emerge because there has been no early 
detection of signals due to a lack of surveillance, monitoring and appropriate 
assessment of relevant indicators. Additionally, particularly in cases of systemic 
risks with high complexity, there are often long periods of time between the 
occurrence of a change driver and its visible effects on the system it has 
influenced. Because of this, there may be no apparent indication that a tipping 
point has been reached. Early warning systems must therefore extend beyond 
observing changes in first-order risks to examining changes in their root 
causes.   
 
The science-society relationship 
When risks begin to emerge, the degree of cooperation between science and 
society is crucial. When cooperation is inadequate or non-existent, risks tend to 
be amplified. Likewise, harmonious cooperation between science and society 
tends to attenuate risks. For example, scientific understanding of how 
pollination services are rendered by ecosystems should enable farmers and the 
agricultural industry to adapt their methods and products so that any harm to 
the pollination process is minimised. The decline of pollination services is a 
concern that scientists and society can and should address together. 
 
The decoupling of science and society, sometimes due to neglect of the 
relationship and sometimes due to public mistrust of science and technology, is 
a matter of concern. Negative public perceptions of science and technology are 
of particular concern, since they threaten the science-society cooperation that 
is critical to dealing with emerging risks. These negative perceptions are 
variable but they include a feeling that the benefits of science are often elusive, 
that realised benefits are not shared equally, that the process of science 
threatens cherished values (e.g., religious and ethical beliefs), and that the 
promise of scientific progress is oversold to enhance taxpayer funding of 
science.  
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Negative perceptions and decoupling can be addressed through concerted 
efforts by colleges and universities, professional societies, and science-policy 
organisations (e.g., in the US they include the National Academy of Sciences 
and the American Association for the Advancement of Science). Long-term 
efforts to raise the scientific literacy of the public are also crucial, since they 
create a societal context in which scientific advances are more likely to be 
understood and appreciated. Equally, science itself needs to be aware that 
merely by conducting research into sensitive issues or controversial 
technologies, it can trigger a perception of risk amongst sectors of the public.   
 
Assessment of innovative technologies 
Business and regulatory practices sometimes allow the rapid diffusion of risky 
technologies without adequate ex-ante risk assessment or ex-post monitoring 
and surveillance of the impacts (intended and unintended). For example, ex-
ante risk assessment of prescription drugs is often quite rigorous but the quality 
of post-market surveillance systems, which are crucial for detecting severe side 
effects, is uneven.  
 
When technology assessments occur, they may be primitive, flawed in their 
design or embedded in an ineffective regulatory system. Common deficiencies 
that act as risk amplifiers include: 
 
• A lack of early methodological work to set out the appropriate 
evaluation instruments; 
• A lack of constructive dialogue and collaboration between developers, 
scientists and regulatory authorities; 
• Resistance to requirements for minimal standards of pre-market 
assessment and post-market surveillance; 
• Insistence on unrealistic safety standards such as zero risk; 
• Unclear allocations of the burdens of proof concerning risk and safety; 
and 
• Weaknesses in the regulatory framework when risks are identified. 
 
Countries around the world vary considerably in the stringency of their 
requirements for pre-market and post-market safety studies. 
 
Regulation 
One of the principal tools of risk governance, regulation, is a stabilising factor in 
society and the economy, and is needed as such. In many countries, 
regulations have achieved cost-effective improvements in the safety of cars, 
the quality of foods, the extent of workplace hazards, and the amount of tailpipe 
pollution from motor vehicles. But regulation has also proven to be clumsy, 
resistant to change, subject to abuse, and costly, thus possibly acting as a risk 
amplifier. Thus, better regulation is integral to any comprehensive effort to deal 
with emerging risks. 
 
Once established, regulatory structures, as well as the processes that produce 
regulations, are rarely revised. Sometimes outmoded regulations stifle the 
development or diffusion of safer technologies (e.g., drug innovation in the US 
was stifled in the 1960s by overzealous federal regulation) while in other cases 
outmoded regulations do not address new risks being created by science and 
technology (e.g., some experts are concerned that nanotechnology products 
are creating risks to human health and the environment that are not controlled 
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by traditional regulatory policies). Fortunately, the OECD, academic centres, 
and think tanks around the world have fostered a systematic effort toward 
better regulation, which includes building more science, economics, flexibility, 
and urgency into regulatory structures and processes. 
 
4.4 Organisation and authority 
A basic requirement of effective governance of emerging risks is an 
organisational capacity (resources, staffing, expertise and allocation of 
responsibility) to anticipate and respond to risks before and as they emerge. 
Anticipating emerging risks is a task that requires specific skills and resources. 
If authorities do not give this task as a priority to dedicated teams, emerging 
risks may be amplified.  
 
Emerging risks may be amplified if a) managers have not designed policies 
aimed at preventing, reducing or spreading the anticipated damages from risks, 
or b) if they have not designed monitoring systems, whether formal or informal, 
to ensure that policies are implemented, enforced, evaluated, and modernised 
over time in light of experience. 
 
If an emerging risk is unfamiliar, it may not have been foreseen when the 
jurisdiction and authorities of regulatory agencies were established. As a result, 
the unforeseen risk may fall through the cracks of existing authorities, leaving 
no regulators accountable for a serious risk that is emerging or has already 
emerged. Thus, when unfamiliar risks emerge, it is vital for regulatory 
responsibilities to be clarified as soon as possible. Sometimes interim 
arrangements may need to be established by existing agencies until the 
relevant political authorities provide clarification with regard to responsibility 
and authority. 
 
For emerging risks that transcend national boundaries or threaten shared 
global resources, the most effective response often requires an international 
strategy that includes participation by many nation states and which involves 
first assessment and then management. Yet the scope of international 
regulatory authority for emerging risks is quite limited and the legitimacy of 
international regulatory authority is sometimes questioned.  Where possible, 
such global risks (for example, those affecting food safety) should be 
addressed through cooperation among nation states but, in the long run, 
effective international regulatory regimes may be the optimal strategy, at least 
for some emerging risks. 
 
 
4.5 Better agenda-setting 
The number of new or potential emerging risks is so large that societies cannot 
possibly address all of them. Whether implicitly or explicitly, societies engage in 
a process of risk selection that determines priorities. In other words, some 
emerging risks are selected for priority attention, while others are ignored or 
deferred until later for consideration. For example, climate change was 
addressed by regulators in Europe earlier than in the US. 
 
Priorities are sometimes misordered due to the influence of interest groups, the 
mass media, and popular opinion.  For example, NGOs may highlight emerging 
risks that have the greatest fundraising appeal among their donors rather than 
the emerging risks that represent the greatest threat to human health, safety 
  
28 
 
and the environment. Likewise, the mass media may focus on emerging risks 
that generate controversy rather than emerging risks that are serious. The 
result may be that politicians and regulators focus on what is controversial 
rather than what is important.  
 
The trend toward “hyper democracy” (the ability for every voter to weigh in on 
every issue that affects their country) also complicates the governance of 
emerging risks, particularly systemic ones. They are typically ill-suited to hyper-
democratic methods (e.g., ballot propositions) because they are scientifically 
complex and lay opinions may be based more on factors such as fear and 
stigma rather than a careful understanding of science and regulatory 
alternatives. 
 
When regulatory authorities are unsure about what to do about an emerging 
risk that has generated controversy, there may be a tendency to “under-
consult” or “over-consult” with the public. When an emerging risk is 
controversial, it is crucial for regulators to understand what people are 
concerned about, including the mental models and perceptions that underpin 
their opinions. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that complete 
reliance on public opinion (which can be quite unstable or ill informed) will lead 
to a wise decision about an emerging risk. 
 
The growing role of the Internet in society means that information about 
emerging risks can be rapidly spread around the globe in a matter of minutes.  
For managers of emerging risks, such rapid dissemination is both a blessing 
and a curse. It allows for rapid warnings of possible harm, including steps that 
citizens, businesses and governments can take to prevent possible harm. But 
such information may also be inaccurate, misleading, or easy to misinterpret by 
lay citizens and activists. For governments that seek to conceal information 
about particular risks from the public the Internet can have a destabilising effect 
that further undermines public confidence in government, science and society.  
Thus, the presence of the Internet underscores the necessity of a climate of 
openness about how emerging risks are being assessed and managed.   
 
In short, better priority setting in the face of multiple emerging risks is one of 
the major challenges faced by practitioners. A climate of openness can help 
build the required trust to make difficult decisions but decision-makers need to 
avoid either too little or too much stakeholder involvement in the priority-setting 
process.   
 
4.6 Resolving conflicts 
The management of emerging risks frequently entails making trade-offs among 
opposing interests. Conflict resolution is a crucial process whenever emerging 
risks trigger disagreements among people with different perceptions, values 
and interests. As we observed in 3.6, the failure of authorities to foster some 
degree of public consensus – or at least a workable reconciliation of conflicting 
views – can act as a driver of risks.  
 
Managing trade-offs through analysis and deliberation 
Trade-off management is a normal task for risk managers, who routinely apply 
methods such as cost-benefit analysis to balance opportunities with emerging 
risks. Trade-off resolution can act as an attenuator to an emerging risk. Even 
though the future of emerging risks is highly uncertain, modern methods of 
cost-benefit analysis can shed light on the economic value of acquiring better 
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information (before making a final decision) as well as promising strategies that 
are robust under a large number of future scenarios.   
 
However, when emerging risks are highly controversial, cost-benefit methods 
are likely to be ineffective at resolving conflict. In some cases, excessive 
reliance on such methods can exacerbate conflict if sponsors of the analysis 
are perceived as hiding ethical assumptions or key intangible considerations in 
a complex mathematical exercise. When emerging risks are highly 
controversial, managers need to explore strategies of deliberation that involve 
key stakeholders and the public. Deliberative processes range from small, 
informal meetings of interest group leaders to high-level commissions with 
representatives from multiple interest groups as well as experts and laypeople. 
 
Overcoming the short-term orientation of reward systems 
When risks emerge, they may not immediately exert any harm. Sometimes the 
period of emergence is quite long, spanning years, decades or even centuries. 
 
Unfortunately, the short-term orientation of reward systems in business and 
government acts to discourage prevention of such long-term risks, thus often 
acting as a risk amplifier. Business leaders are under intense pressure to 
attend to concerns about near-term profit and shareholder value. Politicians are 
geared toward election cycles, which have a shorter time horizon than many of 
the long-term risks facing the welfare of citizens and ecosystems. Even the 
leaders of NGOs dedicated to preventing long-term risks may find that a short-
term orientation is best for enhancing visibility and raising funds for 
organisational needs. Thus, for long-term risks that can be prevented or 
mitigated only by imposing near-term costs or inconveniences, the short-term 
orientation of businesses, governments and NGOs is a major barrier to 
effective action.  
 
Illustrations of this short-term orientation are pervasive in the literature on 
emerging risks: less attention to the long-term aspects of global climate change 
(e.g., damages from sea-level risk and ocean acidification), more focus on the 
traumatic risks at work rather than the long-term risks of disease from chronic 
exposure to toxic agents that cause disease only after a long latency period 
(e.g., asbestos), and more focus by corporate executives and their boards on 
near-term profitability rather than the long-term sustainability of corporate 
strategies.   
 
One solution that has produced some success is an emphasis on the short-
term benefits of policies that also prevent the emergence of long-term risks. In 
China, for example, where concern about localised air pollution (e.g., due to 
immediate health and aesthetic concerns) is greater than concern about global 
climate change, advocates of clean energy sources (e.g., nuclear power and 
renewables) emphasise the near-term benefits of alternative energy as well as 
the long-term protection against climate change.  
 
 
Coping with concentrated interests 
When the management of emerging risks threatens concentrated interests in 
society, efforts to avoid the risks may be blocked or weakened. For example, 
efforts to require that vehicle manufacturers produce more fuel-efficient 
vehicles are slowed by a potent coalition of interests: companies and labour 
unions whose livelihood is linked to the production of large cars, sport-utility 
vehicles and pickup trucks. Likewise, pro-environment efforts to reduce coal 
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use confront well-organised pro-coal interests that include coal companies, 
their miners, investors in railroads, and utilities with coal-fired power plants.  
 
Since virtually all political systems grant – implicitly or explicitly – concentrated 
interests substantial political power, creative – and seemingly expensive – 
solutions may be necessary to accomplish effective control of emerging risks. 
For example, green-car mandates in the US and Europe are accompanied by 
substantial subsidies to assist industrial conversion to cleaner technologies. 
And mandatory limitations on greenhouse gases are sometimes coupled with 
generous subsidies (e.g., to support demonstrations of geological storage of 
carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants). The process of 
providing some compensation to concentrated interests may appear to be 
inefficient and potentially unfair to uncompensated interests but there may be 
no practical alternatives to compensation of concentrated interests that 
accomplish control of the emerging risks.    
 
When seeking to prevent, reduce or spread the damages from emerging risks, 
managers should give some consideration to valid, evidence-supported claims 
of equity, such as concern for highly disadvantaged populations (e.g., the poor) 
and populations or species that are subjected to multiple risks from different 
sources. 
 
The governance of emerging risks may be complicated by political conflict that 
is rooted in religious differences, competing world views or ideologies, or 
deeper struggles for power between competing regions or nation states.  Some 
sources of conflict about emerging risks are more resolvable than others, and it 
is critical for risk managers to ascertain, insofar as possible, what values, 
beliefs and interests are at the heart of apparent disagreements about how to 
prevent, reduce or spread emerging risks. 
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Conclusion 
 
This concept note has advanced preliminary elements for understanding why 
risks emerge in societies. These elements comprise risk sources, drivers, and 
specific governance issues.  
 
In future work, we seek to validate and refine these elements based on case 
studies of real-world risks of different types in various sectors of the world. We 
will then also seek to develop guidelines for use by specific organisations 
because a practitioner in a specific organisation needs to identify those 
emerging risks that are relevant to his or her organisational interests. In the 
course of developing their own emerging-risk guidelines, they will need to 
consider each of the elements that we have identified, coupled with an analysis 
of their vulnerability, a specification of their risk profile, their degree of risk 
tolerance, and the principles that will govern their management strategy. 
  
For the IRGC project to be of most benefit to those responsible for risk 
assessment and management within governments and business, IRGC will 
develop deliverables which will help such people: 
 
• Understand what dimensions can be representative and anticipative of 
the risk environment of their organisation;  
• Link their conceptual understanding of the risk sources, drivers and 
governance issues to their operational environment in order to improve 
their anticipation of new risks; 
• Identify critical areas (environment; health; food; etc) under tension; 
and 
• Make the analysis truly practicable by linking it to conventional 
methods for anticipating the future (e.g., foresight and scenario 
development methodologies, environmental scanning, issue 
management, emerging issues analyses, horizon scanning, long range 
planning, etc). 
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Appendix I: Organisations working on emerging risks 
 
In the course of preparing this concept note, IRGC analysed the work of other 
organisations working on innovative ways to detect and control emerging risks. 
While these organisations do not necessarily use the term “emerging” risks, 
they focus on closely related concerns such as systemic risks, global risks, 
long-term environmental risks, or low-probability, high-consequence events. 
Whatever term they use, all of these organisations are concerned with risks 
having the following characteristics: 
 
• They are associated with a high degree of uncertainty (little 
information is available for risk assessment); 
• They could have a significant impact or high loss potential, which is 
unquantifiable; 
• They are systemic in nature and span beyond the capacity of a single 
country/company/organisation to contain; 
• They are new and/or continue to develop and change in unpredictable 
ways, making them hard to classify; and 
• The risk is complex – it is interlinked with many other risks and it is 
therefore difficult to establish causality between the source of the risk 
and the ensuing loss. 
 
In this section we offer a brief survey of organisations with a strong interest in 
such risks.    
 
The insurers 
The insurance industry seeks to understand as much as possible about 
emerging risks since they may already be impacting their portfolios or may do 
so in the future. Insurers seek to raise awareness of emerging risks within their 
own companies but also externally, in businesses and society at large. 
Internally, with greater understanding of emerging risks, future damages can be 
incorporated into an insurer’s terms, including coverage, pricing, reserves and 
capital allowances. Externally, insurers can advocate for business and policy 
responses that will curtail emerging risks and associated damages.   
 
To take Swiss Re, one of the world’s leading reinsurance companies, as an 
example, it has developed its own early warning system for emerging risks, 
known as SONAR (Systematic Observations of Notions Associated with Risk). 
SONAR is a risk perception network designed to detect initial risk indicators 
and track their potential impact on the insurance business. It uses internal and 
external sources for input of perceptions, observations and comments 
regarding potential new risks, which are then triaged according to a set of 
defined criteria. If this results in the identification of a potential emerging risk, 
then the processes of risk assessment and eventually risk management may 
be undertaken. Essentially, SONAR is a method of continually monitoring the 
risk landscape. 
 
Emerging risks anticipated using tools such as this will then be given further 
attention – for example, Swiss Re, Lloyds, CRO Forum and Allianz all 
produced detailed reports outlining the risks and opportunities of what they see 
as major emerging risks for the insurance industry (for example, 
nanotechnology, pandemics and obesity).  
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Management consultants 
Emerging risks can have such damaging impacts on business and society that 
management consultants are developing tools aimed at helping managers 
detect and respond to emerging risks. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers 
has recently developed a framework for embedding the discipline of addressing 
emerging risks into an expanded application of traditional enterprise risk 
management. This framework can help organisations better prepare for the 
management of emerging risks. 
 
Also widely used in the insurance and private consulting sector is the technique 
of scenario planning (or scenario analysis). This method does not anticipate or 
identify emerging risks but is, rather, useful for estimating the potential 
consequences of emerging risks, in terms of risk exposure to a company and 
its level of preparedness for dealing with the emerging risk. This technique can 
be used for generating and evaluating strategic options for dealing with the risk 
in question. 
 
The public sector 
The public sector also uses these tools. One method of anticipating emerging 
risks that is becoming increasingly popular with governments is horizon 
scanning. Horizon scanning is “a policy tool that systematically gathers a broad 
range of information about emerging issues and trends in an organisation’s 
political, economic, social, technological, or ecological environment. It is also 
used as a synonym for a variety of so-called ‘foresight activities’ that aim to 
develop the capabilities of organisations to deal better with an uncertain and 
complex future” [Habegger, 2009]. This tool does not specifically focus on risks, 
but can be used to improve the anticipation of emerging risks and 
opportunities.  
 
The UK set up a cross-government Horizon Scanning Centre in 2004 which is 
designed to support the horizon scanning and foresight activities carried out in 
a wide variety of UK government departments by providing useful tools and 
spreading good practice. In addition, the centre produces a broad horizon scan 
(the Sigma Scan), which looks at potential future issues and trends that may 
have an impact on public policy, with the ultimate aim of informing Government 
strategy and policy-making. 
 
The UK horizon scanning programme is widely viewed as effective and has 
influenced the establishment of similar programmes abroad. Other countries 
that have experience with horizon scanning projects include the Netherlands, 
Singapore (with a focus on issues of national security) and Australia (with a 
focus on health). 
 
Regulatory agencies and their scientific advisors have for decades sought to 
forecast the emergence of risks in order to set priorities and establish effective 
risk-prevention activities. Although such long-range planning is sometimes 
short-changed when crises cause immediate attention to the “risk of the 
month”, agencies have undertaken some notable efforts to gauge the relative 
size of future risks. Sometimes these exercises do not distinguish current 
(emergent) from emerging risks as defined in this concept note. 
 
For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) sponsored a variety of analytic exercises aimed at 
ranking the major environmental risks facing the US. Influenced by EPA’s lead, 
numerous states initiated their own “comparative-risk” exercises in 
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collaboration with academics and stakeholders. A key finding of these 
exercises was that the risks of strongest concern to the public (e.g., hazardous 
waste sites) are not necessarily the risks of strongest concern to the scientific 
community (e.g., global climate change and radon levels in homes). 
 
In Europe, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was established to 
provide EU regulators with authoritative information on emerging risks related 
to food, including risks to humans, animals or plant health. EFSA sees 
knowledge of emerging risks as a strategy to help policymakers and agenda-
setters to anticipate potential societal problems, threats and opportunities. 
EFSA has set up a working group on emerging risks which has developed an 
overall procedure for emerging risk identification, including priority indicators 
and signals in the areas of chemical, microbiological and nutritional hazards. A 
filtering methodology and a collaborative network between other key partners 
working on emerging risks will be developed in future.  
 
The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) is another 
example. Its main role is to give expert advice and recommendations to EU 
Member States and institutions on network and IT security, and thus it is 
concerned with identifying emerging risks for IT assets. ENISA has developed 
two different framework approaches to anticipating emerging risks – a layered 
risk model and a scenario-based model – and it provides step-by-step 
explanations of how to use these approaches so that EU institutions can apply 
them as necessary 
 
Think tanks, scientific academies, and academic centres 
A wide range of analytic groups are producing research and guidance on 
emerging risks or closely related concerns. These groups vary widely in 
funding base, topics of interest, and degree of scientific rigour in products. 
 
The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) carries out strategic planning 
efforts to identify key themes and trends (and risks along with them) that are 
likely to shape US society and the place of the US in the world in decades to 
come. Its aim in doing this is “to help the Congress and the federal government 
address the challenges that affect the well-being and financial security of the 
American people” [GAO, 2007]. Much of this activity amounts to a forecast of 
emerging risks and opportunities for the US, although GAO does not use the 
term emerging risks as defined in this concept note. 
 
Some international organisations also work on emerging risks. The OECD, for 
example, plays a major role in disseminating information about its member 
countries’ experiences in identifying and managing risks and it has work 
underway on emerging risks with the goal of helping to prepare its member 
countries to anticipate and deal with them. In 2003, the OECD published 
‘Emerging Risks in the 21st Century’, which explores how risks are evolving and 
changing and how society’s capacity to manage them will be affected. The 
book also lays out recommendations for how OECD countries can improve the 
management of emerging systemic risks. This work was mainly to identify 
driving forces and key issues that, by modifying the context in which 
organisations operate, will “reshape conventional hazards and create new 
ones” [OECD, 2003]. 
 
The US National Academies, through the National Research Council (NRC), 
has published a wide range of reports on emerging risks, and issues of risk 
governance. For example, recent NRC reports have addressed how emerging 
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environmental risks should be assessed and managed, how analysis and 
public participation should be combined in risk management, and how 
uncertain risks should be communicated to the public [NRC, 2009]. 
 
Another example is TA-Swiss - The Centre for Technology Assessment (a 
centre for excellence of the Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences), which is 
interested in emerging risks related to new technologies, has as its main 
purpose to make both politicians and the public aware early on of technical 
potentialities and the opportunities and risks of new technologies. Some of the 
key working methods used by TA-Swiss are: expert project studies (where 
experts study new technologies, e.g., anti-ageing medicines, and produce 
reports indicating potential risks and opportunities and giving 
recommendations); discussion forums (where citizens’ opinions on topics, e.g., 
nanotechnology, are gathered and communicated to decision-makers); and, 
communication (hosting events for members of parliament to disseminate 
project findings).  
 
Also concerned with emerging risks in the technology sector is iNTeg-Risk – a 
multi-stakeholder European research project involving many technical 
agencies, which aims to create an integrated scientific and technology 
framework for emerging risk management.  
 
In the environmental field, there are a wide range of think tanks producing 
reports on emerging risks. For example, Resources for the Future, based in 
Washington DC, has a focus on the economic aspects of emerging 
environmental risks. And the World Resources Institute (focussed on protecting 
the environment and improving human lives) in conjunction with the 
International Finance Corporation (focussed on advising investors to build the 
private sector in developing countries) recently published a report on emerging 
risks related to environmental trends in developing countries in Asia and the 
financial implications of these risks for investors.  
 
The ProVention Consortium focuses on funding and conducting work on 
emerging risks that are relevant to disaster reduction in developing countries, 
with the goal of reducing the risks and social, economic and environmental 
impacts of natural hazards on vulnerable populations in order to alleviate 
poverty and contribute to sustainable development. It does this, for example, by 
developing and promoting tools for integrating risk reduction strategies into the 
framework of overall development.  
 
Academic institutions, such as the Wharton Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center (University of Pennsylvania) or the Crisis and Risk Network 
(ETH Zurich) conduct basic and applied research into risk decision-making, 
uncertainty, risk management and the challenges facing the risk community. 
Publications, conferences and training courses contribute to communication 
and dialogue on emerging risk issues and may even offer prescriptive 
analyses. While academic work tends to be broad and not necessarily 
focussed on emerging risks, it is nevertheless a relevant topic – for example, 
the Wharton Center concentrates on research into the risk management of low 
probability/high consequence events. Academics may also serve on advisory 
committees and be part of partnerships with government, NGOs or industry 
interested in anticipating emerging risks.  
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Appendix II: What others say of emerging risks 
 
On converging stresses and breakdowns: 
“I am a believer in nonlinear systems theory. I don’t think that a lot of these 
things will manifest themselves in an incremental way. I would expect, instead, 
that we might see some pretty sharp system shocks… I think that the kind of 
crisis we might see would be a result of systems that are kind of stressed to the 
max already, where policymakers are trying to keep ten balls in the air 
simultaneously and keep all the various constituencies satisfied as best they 
can. And then there’s some exogenous shock on an already highly stressed 
system that produces a kind of overload situation. I’ve always thought that 
“overload theories” or “overload explanations” of social breakdown are probably 
the most persuasive. The best theories of revolution and civil instability 
generally stress that societies face crisis when they’re hit by multiple shocks 
simultaneously or they’re affected by multiple stress simultaneously”. 
 
Thomas Homer-Dixon, the Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity, and the 
Renewal of Civilization, Souvenir Press Ltd, 2007- also in Foreword to “Impacts 
of Climate Change, a System Vulnerability Approach to Consider the Potential 
Impacts to 2050 of a Mid-Upper Greenhouse Gas Emissions Scenario”, Global 
Business Network, 2007 
 
On collapse of societies: 
Easter Island: “the clearest example of a society that destroyed itself by 
overexploiting its own resources… a metaphor, a worst-case scenario for what 
may lie ahead of us in our own future… rational bad behaviour” 
More generally nowadays: “just as in the past, countries that are 
environmentally stressed, overpopulated, or both, become at risk of getting 
politically stressed, and of their governments collapsing. When people are 
desperate, undernourished and without hope, they blame their governments, 
which they see as responsible for or unable to solve their problems. They try to 
emigrate at any cost. They fight each other over land. They kill each other. 
They start civil wars. They figure that they have nothing to lose, so they 
become terrorists, or they support or tolerate terrorism.” 
 
Jared Diamond, Collapse: How societies choose to fail or survive, Allen Lane, 
2005 
 
On driving forces and key issues: 
“The changes likely to affect risks and their management in the coming years 
will occur in four contexts: demography, the environment, technology and 
socioeconomic structures. These will reshape conventional hazards and create 
new ones, modify vulnerability to risks, transform the channels through which 
accidents spread, and alter society’s response. Different forces acting on the 
same risk can neutralize each other’s effects, or reinforce each other for a 
compound effect”. 
“… the key issues that could challenge risk management… fall under five 
headings: heightened mobility and complexity, increasing scale and 
concentration, a changing context and major uncertainties, shifting 
responsibilities, and the importance of risk perception”. 
 
Emerging risks in the 21st century, an agenda for action, OECD, 2003, p.10, 
p.13. 
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On different perceptions of security and privacy: biometrics: 
“Although biometrics seem to be an integral part of many applications that – 
some would argue – improve everyday life, increase security and serve as 
privacy enhancing technologies, they also constitute a serious threat to the 
individual’s privacy. Just as an affirmation might be simultaneously both true 
and false, so can biometrics simultaneously act for and against privacy. The 
interrelatedness of security and privacy is hence once more highlighted in this 
way, as security becomes the balancing force that determines whether 
biometrics are for or against privacy. The mere act of using biometric 
technologies to capture sensitive biometric data constitutes an immense 
privacy concern if security is jeopardised, whereas in a scenario where security 
remains intact, privacy is enhanced and identity theft becomes significantly 
more difficult. However, as experience shows, there is no such thing as perfect 
security and hence biometric implementations are likely to see trade-offs 
between the two ends of the privacy spectrum (truly enhanced or severely 
jeopardised). This makes vital the need for prudent management of the cases 
where security is threatened.” 
 
Biometric Implementations and the Implications for Security and Privacy, 
Andronikou V., Demetis D.S., and Varvarigou T., Future of Identity in the 
Information Society (FIDIS), http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/journal/issues/1-
2007/Biometric_Implementations_and_the_Implications_for_Security_and_Priv
acy.pdf   
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